This paper interrogates the historical role of the civil society in Nigeria's political trajectory spanning through two fundamental epochs-military and democratic. Drawing inferences from a number of historical and comparative approaches, it argues that there is a seeming lull in civil society activism in Nigeria, since its return to democratic rule in 1999. This complacency, the paper argues, appears inextricably linked to Nigeria's prevailing social, political and economic environment, in contrast to what obtained under military rule. The paper concludes with suggestions on how the civil society can contribute meaningfully to the country's attempt towards democratic consolidation.
Introduction
Within the social sciences, there are several methods of conceptualizing and defining civil society. One of the most detailed is provided by the London School of Economics which refers to civil society as the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values (LSE 2006) . Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in degrees of formality, autonomy and power. It is often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups (LSE 2006) . The concept is accepted in modern political science as an intermediary between the private sector and the state. Thus, civil society is distinguished from the state and economic society, which include profit-making enterprises, neither is it the same as family-life society. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between the state, civil society, family and the market are often complex, blurred and negotiated.
Historically, the concept, particularly in its earliest form, dates to the age of enlightenment in the 16th century, and more specifically in the ideas and thoughts of Adam Ferguson, a Scottish philosopher/historian. Ferguson linked the notion of civil society to the development of the economic state, and tied its emergence to the decline of despotism and the corrupt feudal order, and saw the development of a "commercial state" as a means of replacing the corrupt feudal order and strengthen the liberty of the individual (Masterson 2006) . As an ideology, the foundation of civil society can be found in both the liberal and Marxist traditions of European political thought, for example in de Tocqueville's emphasis on the importance of voluntary associations in promoting democratic citizenship and in Gramsci's emphasis on the role of social institutions in either buttressing or challenging state power (Bratton 1994) . A key factor conferring legitimacy on civil society organizations is their knowledge-driven ability which equips members with skills to investigate problems of society, proffer solutions and develop plans to facilitate buy on, by other segments of society and government (Ofoneme 2013) .
Notably, however, the experiences of civil society groups the world over, has shown that while government must be held responsible for translating the will of the citizens into public policy, it is neither the most effective vehicle nor the sole vehicle for the delivery of development (Essia and Yearoo 2009) . In Nigeria, the existence of repressive and unpopular governments for more than 24 years (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) engendered the emergence and proliferation of organizations which sought to challenge the legitimacy of policy, programs and, ultimately, the existence of these governments. No doubt, the existence of the civil society assisted considerably to open up space for the expression of dissenting opinions and what could be regarded as alternative voices. It is in this light that this paper interrogates the place of civil society in Nigeria spanning through two fundamental epochs -military and democratic -in the nation's political trajectory.
Specifically, the paper examines the factors which ignited civil society activism in Nigeria under military rule and asks if the same level of activism can still be accorded the civil society in Nigeria post-military rule. The paper also seeks to investigate the impact of Nigeria's prevailing socio-economic and political environment on the civil society movement since the return of the country to civilian rule. To answer the foregoing, the paper has been structured into five sections, with the first serving as introduction. The second considers the conceptual issues underpinning the notion of the civil society across different spheres. In the third section, emphasis is on the centripetal and centrifugal forces which shaped Nigeria's civil society during its three decades of military rule. The fourth section focuses on the role played by the civil society movement in Nigeria post-military rule, and its attempt towards democratic consolidation. The fifth and concluding section, offers insight into the changes that have occurred in Nigeria's civil society movement since the country's return to civilian rule in 1999, and how these issues can be addressed moving forward.
Civil Society: What does the Literature Say?
The civil society is the bedrock of any civilized country. It is denoted as civil because it is predominantly for both enlightened and the not-so-enlightened members of the society who are united by a bond and aspiration which presuppose the existence of the rule of law, good governance, demand for representative government and protection of the rights of the people, among others. The essential distinguishing elements of a civil society are the autonomy they enjoy from the state, (2) their public character which helps in setting a normative order for the state and help further a common good, and (3) their ability to function as grassroots social movements and draw their strength from solidarity, and the struggle against oppression (Osaghae 1997 , cited Egwu 2008 .
The civil society refers to the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules (Diamond 1995) . Essentially, it serves as a platform 'which enables citizens to act collectively in a public sphere, express their interests, exchange ideas and information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and also hold state officials accountable' (Diamond 1995:2) . As noted by Diamond, a vibrant civil society often functions as an intermediary or entity, standing between the private sphere and the state and, where efficiently-utilized, can function as a tool for democratic transition and democratic consolidation (Diamond 1995) .
Indeed, civil society is distinguishable not only from the family and the state but also from the realm of social action known as 'political society'. Whereas the civil society contains institutions like neighborhood associations, professional bodies, and organized religions, political society refers to political parties, elections and legislatures (Cohen and Arato 1992) . A vibrant civil society can be a multiplier for all human rights, driving sustainable economic development and reinforcing good governance; and a force for stability and the rule of law. Economies and societies tend to thrive when people freely contribute ideas and hold their governments to account. A vigorous civil society is increasingly concerned about how nations compete in today's interconnected world, where innovation, creativity, and a dynamic 'knowledge economy' confer comparative advantage (UK Report 2014).
Emerging from the above is the assumption that civil society encompasses a wide range of organizations concerned with public matters. They include civic, issue-oriented, religious, and educational interest groups and associations. Some are known as non-governmental organizations, or NGOs while others are informal and loosely structured. This is evident in Carothers' explanation:
… at the core of much of the current enthusiasm about civil society is a fascination with nongovernmental organizations, especially advocacy groups devoted to public causes -the environment, human rights, women's issues, election monitoring, anti-corruption, and other good things(Carothers 2000:2).
Civil society, as Bratton further contended, offers an opportunity to understand, and influence, the process of democratization, and that the renewal of interest in democracy has placed civil society in a prominent position in both social science theory and development policy (Bratton 1994 ). This viewpoint has been re-echoed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who noted that the inclusion of a political component in the definition of civil society is a vital component in 20 th century democracies (Almond and Verba 1963) . The conclusion was informed by their research which sought to understand why some democratic societies survived the Great Depression, and others moved away from democratic governance towards various forms of nationalist and fascist government. The engagement alongside vitality of civic organizations as well as groupings, and their active and deliberate involvement in the political decision-making processes of government contribute to a democratic state's likelihood of survival (Almond and Verba1 1963) .
Of critical importance to a civil society is its inherent ability to enhance good governance by playing advocacy roles and addressing unidentified, unaddressed problems and bringing such to public discourse (Fadakinte 2013 The historically-specific nature of the civil society notwithstanding, the concept has continued to generate interest and debate in Western and non-Western contexts (Lewis 2002) . The academic discourse on civil society in Africa might be still growing, but it has continued to be haunted by persistent doubts regarding the nativity of the concept, and its applicability or otherwise to African social and political circumstances (Obadare 2004 As noted by Obadare, the alternative genealogy of civil society seems partly to have grown out of the desire to respond to the misgivings associated with the concept, and to provide a description of civil society which, while not totally divorced from its original meaning, strikes out in newer directions, and takes into cognizance the radical ways in which the notion of civil society continues to be used in non-Western societies (Obadare 2004 ). The conceptual framework for understanding civil society as a process contains several elements that help in articulating these existing processes. It combines an abstract notion of state and civil society in a dialectical relationship with theoretical discussions specific to post-colonial African countries including the nature of state and society in Africa, analysis of power, and organizational aspects of collective action. This conceptual framework is not intended to be complete, coherent or unified, but rather it offers an example of what analytical tools might be employed to understand civil society as process (Whitefield 2002).
According to Chazan 1992:283, 'the relaxation of official controls over associational life, the closure of alternatives to interaction within the state framework, and the expansion of communication networks', constitute three essential conditions conducive to a flourishing civil society. However, in Africa, civil society faces multiple challenges that, if not addressed, will compromise its effectiveness and results. To begin, the civil society sector is increasingly becoming dangerously corporatized with limited connections to people's daily struggles leading to loss of original grassroots-based social mobilization approaches as the sector is gradually leaning more and more towards meetings, workshops and boardroom advocacy. In environments of dictatorships, civil society practice self-censorship, it is cowed to submission by repressive regimes and has become vulnerable to infiltration.
In Nigeria, a critical study of its political history reveals that the civil society was well-developed and organized before the advent of colonialism, hence the right of the nation to self- Military repression and economic stagnation combined to whittle away the Nigerian state, forcing most Nigerians to seek civil society alternatives for political organization, expression, and protection…While many Nigerian politicians relinquished to blind political expediency and followed the military's transition paths to nowhere, civil society became the only sphere where democratic political activity and leadership in national democracy promotion could be found (Kew 1990 :1).
However, the growth and development of civil society in Nigeria has been intermittent. Once the assumed missions had been accomplished, civil society disintegrated or retreated into isolation, only to surge again when threats reappeared. The state has played an enormous role in the development of civil society in Nigeria through co-optation, manipulation, and oppression since independence in 1960. As observed by Alamu, 'virtually all the institutions inherited from [Nigeria's] colonial masters are so thoroughly debased and deformed that they have become a 9 sick joke. The degeneracy of these vital institutions is so complete that there hardly exists a possibility of redemption' (Alamu, The Nation 8 July, 2012).
For instance, rather than building bonds across society along issues of shared interests, civil society groups are frequently organized along intergroup differences, reinforcing societal divisions. Similarly, too often, these civil society groups are highly personality-driven at times, serving the political interests of an individual rather than a broader social concern. Equally noticeable, these organizations are often governed with the same limitations on participation, expression, free and fair leadership elections, and accountability as a governing regime, making them poor training grounds for democratic models of governance (ACSS 2011). Also, divisions among the Nigerian civil society along the ethnic and regional lines have not helped democracy advocacy; this has led to disunity and disagreement among the Nigerian NGO practitioners in terms of decision-making and unity of purpose. This is further examined in subsequent sections of this essay.
Civil Society and the Military Epoch: "A Common Enemy"-Driven Struggle?
The fast-expanding role civil society organizations have assumed in modern development has become so important that no government desirous of exploiting and harnessing the potentials of its citizens for national development can afford to ignore it (Essia & Yearoo 2009 ). Recent years have witnessed significant discussions regarding the composition of civil society in the African context. This is largely due to the role of civic organizations and groups in the struggle for liberation initially from colonial rule, and later in the quest for democratic governance. In many instances, analysts who conduct in-depth examination of the emergence and significance of groups and organizations within societies, and how these groups impact on the priorities of government and state institutions, omit a proper consideration of civil society as a concept within their context (Masterson 2006) . As Lewis observes:
The global resurgence of autonomous popular organization, civic activism and political contestation has provoked a search for analytic tools to help us make sense of these historic shifts in state-society relations. Despite its origins in European political theory, the idea of civil society has often appeared as a universal verity in comparative analyses of democratic change. Yet the concept has revealed many permutations, even within the European context, and its applicability to African circumstances is by no means self-evident (Lewis 1995: 24) .
The activities of civil society organizations have, over the years, engineered several forms of development in Nigeria. The activities range from protesting against certain government policies to organization of seminars, conferences and enlightenment programmes to educate the masses or citizens on human rights and how to kick against abuse of such rights (Ofoneme 2013 If civil society is viewed as the panacea for freedom; protection and advocacy of the civil rights and liberties; resistance against state repression; the mobilizing arena for the protection and projection of substantive interests; the compelling impetus for state moderation; and the epitome of popular struggles and civil power , it becomes expedient to examine how relevant it can be, or has been, within the context of this discussion. It is notable that Nigeria has long enjoyed a vibrant civil society and a rough-and-tumble media that is famous across Africa.
It has a flourishing English language press, much of it in private hands. As the Nigerian state progressively lost its 'stateness' and degenerated under consecutive military regimes, into a 'statist' cocoon, as succeeding heads of the junta became increasingly hegemonic over both the junta and the polity, they were also subjected to increasing international pressure to democratize, especially following the annulment of Nigeria's June 1993 election.
Between 1993 The aftermath of this on Nigeria's polity was catastrophic, given that a vast majority of these CSOs lacked the capacity to determine the direction of political change in Nigeria. Nigerian youths, majority of who were, and are still largely unemployed, became instant tools in the hands of the leadership of these organizations, leading to the birth of a number of militant groups with propensity for violence. Because only a blurred line existed between CSOs and these ethnic groupings, a number of the leadership of these pro-democracy groups either became supporters or members of militant movements. This is evident in the case of Beko Ransome-Kuti, the leader of Campaign for Democracy (CD) who later became the national treasurer of OPC. Other prominent political figures, who were patrons to some of these organizations, had to work with groups with strong grassroots following, thereby lengthening Nigeria's road to democratic consolidation (Agbaje 1994).
As a consequence of the apparent 'mixture' of ethnic and regional idiosyncrasies by members, pro-democracy organizations, which are the bedrock of Nigeria's civil society movement, have not been able to command grassroots following. As well, they have not been able to construct a strong national network for the promotion of liberal democratic values in governance. This weakness or the seeming inability of pro-democracy civil society organizations to sustain the momentum they gained during the battle to end Nigeria's tyrannical military dictatorship under Babangida and Abacha's juntas, as some have argued, was further exacerbated by the multiple governmental structures spawned by democratic rule (Agbaje 1994).
It is worth mentioning that regardless of the fact that Nigeria operated a federal system of three tiers of government under the military, the conduct of government concerns, to a large extent, reflected command structure, evocative of military rule. Under this system, sole administrators who presided over Nigeria's 36 states and 774 local governments were appointed by, and accountable to, the head of state. It should however be noted that the civil society movement, since Nigeria's return to civilian rule, has played commendable roles that have helped in deepening Nigeria's attempt towards democratic consolidation. It perhaps bears mentioning that many investigations of allegations of corrupt practices by government officials were as a result of pressure mounted by civil society groups that demanded accountability in the face of scandals (Ukase and Audu 2015) .
Similarly, the media, through its investigative and incisive reportage, have provided an important counterpoint to the abuse of entrusted power for private gains, and the basic knowledge with which citizens can hold public and private institutions accountable. They have also collaborated with anti-graft and other law-enforcement agencies to expose corruption in low and high places. These positive contributions notwithstanding, the present paper contends that for Nigeria's civil society to continue to contribute meaningfully to Nigeria's democratization process, concrete attempts must be made to get them well-structured. As well, where possible, this should be under a clearly-defined and interest-based coalition. Such arrangements, where properly executed, have a tendency to confer on CSOs, the audacity and ability to command respect, as evident in NADECO's ability to cause significant upset in the dying days of Nigeria's military junta.
In the concluding section, this paper briefly examines the major contrast between the performance of the civil society during civilian and military epochs, and the lessons that civil society can learn moving forward.
Concluding Remarks
Evolving from the preceding discussions, the experience of Nigeria's civil society under the two epochs considered leads to a number of conclusions. The civil society movement under the military appeared united in their pursuit of a common objective-the desire to return Nigeria to democratic rule. This uniformity of purpose drove their ambition and defined the vigor with which they pursued and achieved it. This development sharply contrasts with the trend under successive civilian administrations in Nigeria since 1999. If there has been any unifying force in Nigeria's civil society movement post-1999, it is the desire to maximize personal profit out of engagements with government.
Similarly, and as presently constituted, the civil society in Nigeria, operates in splinters, and lacks coherence, owing to the needless duplication of objectives and focus among the constituent entities. The resultant effect of this on Nigeria's democratization effort is that the regnant government feels relatively comfortable to ignore them. For example, between March 15 and April 10, 2016, Nigerians were subjected to very harrowing experiences occasioned by fuel shortage and extremely-erratic supply of electricity, which brought Nigeria to its knees. (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) and Sani Abacha (1993 Abacha ( -1998 regimes, when every action was met with an equal or (at times) greater reaction.
The development reinforces this paper's contention that numerous issues have been left unresolved by the civil society in Nigeria since the return to democracy in 1999. At the heart of the development is paucity of funds experienced by majority of civil society groups, particularly those with little or no financial base or affiliation to international donors. Consequently, they sometimes rely on the government, politicians, and corporate organizations to finance their programmes. This has compromised their ability to boldly confront intimidation and discharge their statutory responsibilities to the larger society. It further implies that they lack transparency in how they spend funds from donors and, this breeds corruption in the final analysis.
Rather than sustaining the tempo of activism launched during the military era in the 1980s and 1990s, in some ways, CSOs have comparatively gone passive under the current system. This could have resulted from fatigue, ideological conspiracy, complacency and short-sightedness as the activists appear to have concluded that they had won the 'real' battle, assuming that democracy would naturally protect the civil society (Akanle 2009: 233) . Since the transition from military dictatorship to the current civil dispensation, Nigeria's quest for effective democratic governance has been confronted by many challenges. Indeed, the emergence of democratic rule and the challenges of its sustenance and overall development that facilitates its stability have foisted new perceptions on civil society. According to Ikelegbe the dominant view is that CSOs should now focus on social action, advocacy, development issues and governance (Ikelegbe 2013: 439) . This perception shifts CSOs from a predominantly adversarial, confrontational, combative and oppositional formation to a more dynamic, creative and constructive movement which embraces dialogue, cooperation, collaboration, mutual support and consultation. While this paper aligns with Ikelegbe's submission, it also contends that, if expedient, CSOs' strategies could accommodate civil disobedience.
The paper submits that civil society should be taken into account at different stages of Nigeria's decision-making, particularly on issues of governance and development. This has become pertinent given that civil society has the capacity to provide the all-important input for the identification of key challenges confronting the citizenry, and which areas the government can, and should, prioritize. Another is that by being closely connected at grass-roots level, civil society can provide constructive inputs into the formulation of policy options reflecting broad public interests, opinions and demands, thus complementing government efforts. The paper submits that a vibrant and actively-engaged civil society in Nigeria will ultimately highlight authoritarian abuse(s) and help build a domestic and international momentum vital for change.
Finally, the re-emergence and sustenance of a robust civil society movement, as witnessed during Nigeria's dark days, can provide for, and also lead to, peaceful mass mobilization.
Inarguably, this will help in getting the public involved and sustain their commitment to accountable leadership alongside other governance deliverables. This can also help create in them a sense of inclusiveness and involvement in the way they are being governed contrary to what obtained during Nigeria's dark days of military dictatorship.
Notes

